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INTRODUCTION
Many governmental programs are effective only if firms make some costly investment. The problem is widespread, but for concreteness we shall speak of enwronmental regulation. We may consider the installation of scrubbers by electrical utilmes, of R & D expenditures by automobile manufacturers to reduce emis-,;ions by vehicles, of the construction of refinery equipment to produce unleaded gasohne, or of the installation of water-cleaning equipment by chemical manufaclurers. To give more specific examples, the Energy Pohcy and Conservation .Act of 1975 reqmred firms to increase the fuel efficiency of the cars they produce, which called for investments in tools to produce front-wheel-drive vehicles, research and development into lighter weight materials, and so on. The 1970 .amendments to the Clean Air Act were expticitly technology-forcing, calling for 90% reductions in emissions by 1975, a goal that was unachievable with 1970 technology.~ Regulatory programs which require firms to invest may be subject to a time-inconsistency problem caused by the strategic behawor of firms. A firm may choose not to invest, thereby both keeping its costs low and reducing the government to abandon its plan of u-nposing regulations. That is, a firm potentially subject to regulation may recognize that if it does not invest, then government may find it best not to enforce the regulation.
In this paper, we show that such incentives, which resenable a hold-up problem, may" not be overcome when government's only tool is the imposition of an emisslon tax. The hold-up problem can be overcome by the issuance of tradeable permits if more than two firms operate in the same industry. A time-consistent equilibrium ean exist with all firms investing and the government imposing regulations, even ff no permits are traded and their market price is low. Indeed, an observation of no trade may indicate that pollution abatement is great.
FURTHER EXAMPLES OF COMMITMENT PROBLEMS
In this section we provide further examples for the commatment problem of regulators. Consider regulatory programs to reduce automobile emissions. Suppose firms did not invest and thus could not meet the standards. Enforcing the standards would effectively forbid the sale of new cars, would close down factories, and would throw hundreds of thousands of workers out of work. The harshness of the threat makes it not credible. But if the threat as not credible, then firms will not invest.
The automobile manufacturers recognize such incentives. 2 Faced with concerns about pollution in southern Cahfornia, the automobile companies responded that pollution was a tough problem requiring additional research. But they did little research. Instead, in 1955 they signed a cross-hcensing agreement giving each firm royalty-free rights to any patents on emission eqmpment--no firm had an incentive to engage m research. This agreement was challenged m 1969 by the U.S. Department of Justice, which claimed that the manufacturers colluded to delay the development of emission control technology. The breakthrough in emission control came in 1963 when Califorma enacted a law requiring the installation of emission controls 1 year after the state certified that two devices were practical and avmlgele at reasonable cost. Equipment manufacturers took up the challenge, and in 1964 the automobile manufacturers announced that they would install emission controls in new cars.
Later regulation continued to suffer from credibility problems. The standards specified by the 1970 Clean Air Act were repeatedly delayed. Most dramatically, faced w~th industry claims that the current emission standards would shut down factories, Congress amended the Act in 1977, we@ening and postponing the standards. Similarly, in 1988 the government delayed standards for the 1989 model year.
Another example illustrates credlbdlty problems. In 1998 Congress included a prowslon in the highway bill which would put off for 6 to 9 years the first steps to bnng states into comphance with the Clean Air Act's longstanding goal of "reasonable progress" toward eliminating man-made haze in specially protected areas. Until Congress intervened, the Environmental Protection Agency had planned to tell states to file preliminary plans by 1999 showing how they would eventually comply with new rules proposed last year that would raise visibtlit7 standards gradually over the next several decadesP While credibility is often a problem for regulators, they can sometimes commit to certain policies. If the president and Congress belong to &fferent political parties, then changing legislation may be difficult. When environmental groups can sue in the courts to force the regulatory agency to implement the law, the credibility becomes yet stronger. 4 In addition, as pointed out by Amacher and Matik [1] a regulator has an incentive to develop means to commit hamself to an i nstrument.
RELATION TO THE LITERATURE
The essential idea that threats or promises by government may not be credible appears in some important work on trade protection (Staiger and Tabellini [18] , Matsuyama [13] , Tornell [19] ); regulation of utilities (Salant and Woroch [17] , Gilbert and Newbery [4] , Urbiztondo [20] ); and pnvatlzation (Levy and Spiller [11] ). These analyses relate to the hold-up problem--a firm facing a single buyer may fred investment unprofitable if, after making the investment, the buyer will offer to pay only marginal cost (see Klein, Crawford, and Alchian [8] , Joskow [5] , Williamson [24] ).
Our analysis also relates to models of mechanism design that use the tools of multistage games and subgame perfect eqmlibria (see Varian [22] or Moore [15] for a review of the literature). We show that tradeable permits, a regulatory mechamsm that has been favored for reasons unrelated to credibility, may solve the hold-up problem. Indeed, whereas the usual justification for permits (the opportumty for firms with low abatement costs to abate more than firms with high costs) requires that firms differ and that trades are made in equihbrmm, we show that marketable permits can be effective even if all firms are identical and no permits are traded. It is important, however, that agents anticipate that trading occurs for out-of-eqmlibnum actions.
Finally, our paper relates to the hterature on environmental regulation and to the work on strategic considerations of firm behavlor (Yao [25] , Mahk [12] , Biglaiser, Horowitz, and Quiggin [2] ). Yao [25] examines the dynamics of technology-forcing regulations given technologmal uncertainty and asymmetric innovation about renovation capacities. He finds that the initial level of R & D actMt 7 caused by regulation increases with the intrinsic technical capability of the industry. Malik [1'2] compares permanent and interim regulation when a regulator anticipates learmng about the benefits or costs of regulations over time. He shows that neither policy is first best. He also identifies conditions under which one policy dominates the other one. Biglaiser, Horowitz, and Qulggin [2] address the time inconsistency of optimal permit regulanon. They show" that tradeable pollunon permits may not achieve the social optimum because firms behave strategically against the regulator.
While these models consider the game between an industry or a representative firm with the regulator, we consider an oligopoly of firms facing a regulator. 5 Moreover, we require that regulation be time-consistent and credible at every point in time. The paper's contribution thus lies m considering how a single firm's decisions can affect the policy government adopts for the whole industry.
A firm that invests in abatement weighs the following considerations. First, the investment may cause government to impose the regulation which it would not if this firm had not invested. Second, a firm that invested may gain from selhng pollution permits to firms that did not invest. The magnitude of these effects will depend, inter aha, on the number of other firms that invest. We thus examine equilibria in which firms make investment decisions strategically: they take into account how other firms decide on their investments and how government pohcy is affected by the firms' investment decisions.
As will be seen, an equilibrium can appear in which all firms invest when the following chain of events occurs: a firm's investment reduces government to allocate permits (corresponding to the socially optimal level of emissions given the investments firms made), and the investing firm can then sell permits to firms that did not invest (they would buy the permits rather than abate because a firm that did not invest faces a hlgh marginal cost of abatement). A solution with no firm investing may therefore not be an equihbrmm, while a solution with all firms investing can be a subgame perfect equilibrium. Emission taxes will be seen to be less suitable in solving the hold-up problem. A firm that invested would incur the cost of investment, would have to recur abatement costs, and would have to pay taxes for the remaining emissions. Therefore, mcentwes to invest are lower under emission taxes than with marketable permits.
Finally, our paper ~s related to work about incentives to adopt less polluting technologies in the design of environmental policy instruments. Milliman and Prince [14] and Jung, Krutflta, and Boyd [7] examine the incentives of firms to invest m new technology, under different regulatory methods and provide a ranking of different policy instruments. Laffont and Tarote [101 show that simple markets for pollution permits reduce incentwes for innovation, and propose options to pollute as a better policy. Requate [16] considers output markets and shows that permits allow for partial adopUon of new technologies while taxes do not. Requate and Unold [16a] challenge the general presumption that permit markets provide higher incentives to renovate than taxes (see also [2a]).
MODEL
Consider the following four-stage mechanism.
Stage 1. Farms decide whether to make an investment that allows them to later reduce emissmns. The investment ~s lumpy and sunk, costing K to each firm. Call a firm that has invested a "prepared" firm. Stage 2. Government observes the investment of firms. It then imposes identical regulations on the firms: each f~rm must either abate by a certain 5An exceptxon Is Blglalser, Horowltz, and Qmggm [2] They also aIlow firms to influence the amount of permlts tssued by regulator, wtuch m turn affects the costs of buying permits for other firms However, they consider marginal investment changes that do not allow efficmnt firms to obtain large profits by selhng permits to polluting firms amount or hold permits for the unabated emissions. Government allocates emission permits equally to each firm. The key assumpnon about commitment that (1) the regulator is unable commit to the stringency of the policy instrument, and (2) For simphcity, we focus on investment to reduce emissions, and we take pIoduction capacity and output as fLxed. We therefore suppose that each firm pioduces one umt of the good at a fixed price.
The cost of emissions reduction in the amount v by a prepared firm is C(v). The secial costs from emissions x are D(x). These functions are assumed to satisfy 1. C' >0;C" >0 2. D'>0;D" >0 6 As stated m the previous footnote, the assumption of equahty is not crltmal A crmcal assumptmn is that a prepared firm receives at least as many permits as an unprepared firm 7 The government adjusts the level of poltutmn allowances depending on how many ftrms invested.
Thus, the mefficmncms of slmple pollution markets for env~ronmentaI renovation, d~scussed m Laffont and T1role [9] , do not occur. 9 At the beginning of the game all firms are identical° This represents a strong departure from typical analyses of tradeable permit schemes, whmh usually require heterogeneity of firms m order to generate gains from trade.
Soczal Optmzum in Stage 2
A socially optimal sotution is characterized by two variables: the number of firms that invest, l, and the level of abatement by each prepared firm, v. Let emissions by a firm with zero abatement be f0: these are emissions by any unprepared firm, and by any prepared firm which sets v = 0.
Consider first the social optimum when l firms invest. From the assumption that C'> 0 and that C" > 0 it follows that minimizing abatement costs requires prepared firms to abate m equal amounts. The first-order condition is 1°D
'(.T° -lv) = C'(v).
Let v(l) solve the social welfare problem, which solution is assumed to be umque. Our assumptions imply that
LEM~ 1. v(l) weakly decreases monotomcally m
Clearly, the greater the number of firms that invested, the less any one firm needs to reduce emissions. Let W(l) be social costs when l firms invest and the socially optimal abatement levels v(l) are Implemented. Then (2) In the following assume that w(.) < w(.-1)... < w(1) < Hence social optimahty requires all firms to investJ (3)
W(l) = D(.f° -I-v(O) + l-C(v(l))

The Markets for Emission Perrmts
The government observes how many firms have invested, and then sets the number of permits at
Q = nf° -I. v(l).
]Put differently, all but lv(l) umts of ernisslon are covered by permits; the firms naust abate, in the aggregate, in the amount lv(l). Permits are allocated equally among firms, so that each firm receives an allocation of
O l _ = f0 _ _. v(l).
n n By assumption for an unprepared firm can reduce emissions only by reducing output. That wouid reduce expenses for permits, but would reduce revenue. In the following, we assume that the market price of an emission permit for any positive number of investing firms is lower than marginal losses from reducing emissions by reducing output. Hence, unprepared firms will demand, l -.v(l), 7. additional permits to meet their emission requirements. Aggregate demand for emission permits is therefore, l (n-0.--.v(0. n Consider the supply of emission permits by a prepared firm. Let p be the market price of a permit. Because the number of firms need not be large, each firm may have market power m determining the price of permits. Investment will be most attractive g a firm can sell permits at a high price (say by extracting revenue determined by a buyer's all-or-nothing demand curve); it will be least attractive if the firm can earn little revenue. If there are few firms on both market sides, very different price eqmhbria can eyast in the permit market (Gersbach [3] ). In the following, we focus on the competitive equilibrium. This can be justified by two reasons. First, a W equilibrium in the permit market must involve prices equal to or above the competitive price. The competitive eqmhbrium is the least attractive for prepared firms. Any other type of equilibrium would only strengthen our results.
Second, the government can ensure that the competitive equilibrmm results by influencing the strategm behawor of prepared firms through supplementing the supply. This is a common practice in part of the environmental regulation in the United States, in particular for controlling sulfur dioxide. If the government supplements the supply of permits to the competitive supply curve, given that l firms have invested, no prepared firm gains by deviating from price-taking behawor in the permit marketJ 2 Holding back with permits would simply be compensated by an additmnal supply of the government. Given that a firm cannot gain by deviating from price-taking behavior, a prepared firm, say firm i, solves the following problem,
Hence, a prepared firm ~ sets v, to satisfy p = C' (v,) . Denote the solution bỹ ,(p). Then the supply of permits by a prepared firm
n Aggregate net supply of pernnts by prepared firms is Eqmlibrium in the market for pernnts reqmres
We thus obtain
,
(p) = v(l) and p = C'(v(I)).
(9)
Let p(l) be the market price of a permit when l firms invest. Because v(l) decreases with l, we obtain LEMMA 2. p(1) >_ -" > p(n).
Equihbrium
We characterize the subgame perfect eqmhbna in the four-stage game by establishing the following propositions: PROPOSITION 1. Suppose n = 1. Then, a umque subgame perfect equthbnum exists: The firm does not invest and the regulator issues,
Q =f0
permits.
The proposition follows lmmediately from our assumptions. Because the unprepared firm cannot be credibly threatened with regulation, the firm minimizes costs by not investing. The system of marketable perrmts cannot help to alleviate the investment incentwes. The situation is dlfferent ff more firms are present in the market. PROPOSITION 
Suppose that n > 2 and
n-1 n --.v(n --1).p(n -1) > K + C(v(n)).
Then there ~s an equd~brium m whzch all firms invest and government sets (lO)
Prepared firms set v, = v(n).
Q = n.f° -n.v(n). (11)
Proof If one firm devaates by not investing, while the other n -1 firms invest, its cost of buying perrmts is n-1 --~,(n-1).p(nn ]if the cost of permits is greater than the cost of investment (that is, ff (10) satisfied), the firm will find it unprofitable to deviate. Hence, if all firms invest, no firm deviates and the strategies described are an equilibnum. Because Q is the level of emissions that maximizes social welfare, the government finds it optimal to limit emissions and to issue permits in Stage 3. Hence, the equilibrium is subgame perfect.
Q.E.D.
Condition (10) in the proposition has a straightforward interpretation. The firm anticipates the regulator's reaction to a change in the number of investing firms and calculates the costs of buying permits in if it does not invest. Finally, these costs are compared with the cost of investment. Whether the condition is fulfilled depends crucially on the propemes of the cost function.
An Example
Condition (10) D(x) = ax and C(v) = (b,/2) Note that the condition is easier to fulfill if marginal social cost of emissions is high, the marginal cost of abatement is low, the number of firms is high, and preparation costs are low. For any set of parameters {n, a, b} the hold-up problem can be solved if K is sufficiently small and n > 2.
Uniqueness
We also provide necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness of the fall investment equilibrium. 
min (n-l-1 l<n-1 n
The equiltbnum in which all firms invest is unique tf and only tf ' )
Proof We show that the outcome with only l < n firms investing is not an equihbrium if condition (12) (14) If the sum of expressions (13) and (14) exceeds the investment costs and abatement costs, the firm profits from investing: the bu~come with only l < n firms investing is not an eqmhbrium.
We also claim that the condition in the proposition is necessary. For proof we first consider l = 0 as a possible equilibrium. A firm that had invested would gain revenue from selling permits of In short, a time-consistent, socially optimal eqmhbrium can be attained with marketable permits.
EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS
We have seen that tradeable permits can solve a hold-up problem. The model can be extended in several directions. First, we could solve for optimal emission taxes, denoted by t(t), which, hke the amount of permits, depend on the number of prepared firms when taxes are determined in Stage 2. Government sets a tax that induces prepared firms to reduce emissions to ex post efficient levels. Hence t(l) = C'(v(l)) for l > 1. So in addition to investment costs and costs of emission reduction, prepared firms must pay an emxssion tax. Because the sum of emission taxes and the costs of abatement are lower for the investing than for noninvesting firms, investment may still be profitable. However, it is evident that the hold-up problem may be less problematic or may be more easily solved with a system of marketable permits because prepared firms gain from selling permits instead of paying taxes.
For simplicity of presentation, we assumed that firms that do not invest In abatement equipment can reduce their emissions only by reducing output. Suppose instead that unprepared firms can also reduce their emissions, albeit at a higher marginal cost, denoted by Cu,,(v), than prepared firms. Then the previous analysis still holds as long as C'un(0) Is greater than marginal costs of prepared firms at the socially optimal emission reduction level u(l). If this is not the case, social optimality also reqmres noninvesting to abate to some extent. Because the number of permits unprepared firms need to buy declines, the advantage of marketable permits in solving the hold-up problem declines. However, the hold-up problem itself is less serious in this case, because the regulator can induce noninvesting firms to reduce emissions.
Firms may be able to invest in abatement equipment ex post, after the regulator has issued permits. In such a model, with multiple time periods, firms could decide on Investment, In each period allowing them to reduce emissions in the nextperiod. If the life of permits covers more than one period, an equilibrium is more likely to have no firms investing. An unprepared firm could invest ex post to save the expenses for permits if other firms have invested. This would reduce the incentives for firms to invest upfront because prices of permits would fall A detailed analysis of the dynamic interaction of investment decisions and credibility in permit markets is, however, needed to obtain a complete picture of investment incentives. 13 Moreover, in such a framework we could allow firms to vary the investment levels continuously between zero and an upper bound. This could induce firms to overinvest, with the aim of gaining from the sale of permits. On the other hand, the penalties from less mvestment than socially optimal is punished less by the need to buy the remaining permits Whether we obtain soclally optimal investment levels or underinvestment or overmvestment depends crucially on the mvestment cost function and the cost function for emission reducUons. A complete analysis is left for future research (see atso Gersbach [3] ).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The model leads to several conclusions. Under some conditions, marketable permits can tead to the socially efficient solution if the regulator can commit to open the market for permits after firms have invested. Marketable permits can be effective even if, in equilibrium, no permit is traded and its price is low. That IS, the advantages of permits lie not only in allomng emissions to be reduced by the firms that can do it most cheaply.
Market structure can be important for the effectiveness of regulations. In particular, whereas a monopolist may be able to resist regulation, firms in a market with two or more noncolluding firms can be induced to invest.
Negotiations about new environmental regulations with industry associations can exacerbate the hold-up problem. As observed in the German automotive industry, industry associations can argue that Introducing pollution reduction is too costly. Negotiations with industry associations are often viewed as promoting consensus about feasible technology improvements. Because, however, firms benefit if they can commit not invest, the industry association may promote collusion to avoid investment.
:3 See also B~gImser, Horowitz, and Qmggm [2] The market solution may apply to other hold-up problems. For instance, the regulator may design a cross-licensing market for patent rights for an innovation that lowers the cost of compliance with the regulation. Equilibria with such a four-stage mechanism are characterized by at least one firm innovating: for if no other firms invest, the profits in the license market are high.
We say that taxes are less smtabte to solve the hold-up problem. In particular, emission taxes can yield equilibria with fewer (and in particular with no) firms investing. Although emission taxes would be lower for the complying firm than for noninvesting firms, the investing firms only save part of the emission tax, but it is not compensated for its investment as It would occur under permit markets. When government can regulate by issuing permits, the equilibrium (given the same cost conditions) may have investment and regulation [for details see Gersbach [3] ]. 14 Consider, moreover, the pohtical pressures on government if some firms did invest. Under Pigovian taxes no firm profits from the imposition of an emissions tax. Under permits, those firms that did invest may profit from regulation of emissions, because the regulation allows prepared firms to earn revenue by selling permits. Of course, unprepared firms lose from the imposition of emission regulal:~ons. But they also lose under emissions taxes.
